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The logo for the Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública (INAP) is displayed in a bold, black, sans-serif font. The letters 'I', 'N', 'N', and 'P' are stylized and connected, with the 'P' having a distinctive shape.

The democratic transition and social mobility as a result of a social modernization process

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Introduction

Understanding the democratic transition and social mobility requires, not only to have the study of recent developments in a country resulting from the alternation in power, but demands to analyze the development and evolution of historical facts in the economic, social, political and cultural subsystems that generated them and belong to a social modernization process.

From the interaction of the economic, social and political subsystems, understanding that the cultural aspect can be considered as part of the social one, it's demonstrated that the quality of democracy is associated to the citizenship horizon expansion phenomenon, in other words, the solution of the social exclusion and cohesion issues, the citizenship expansion phenomenon, and finally, the issue of participation undergoing a decision making process in the local, regional and centralized levels.

Likewise, the modernization process through the distribution of power analysis and social satisfaction has coined the political development of countries, through the study of social changes.

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
For social modernization, we must understand the highly volatile social organization process, so that it allows to optimize or maximize the available resources for a society: procedures, rules, rationality, natural resources, human resources, laws, associations, etc. Defining its purpose in translating economic integration processes and changes in technological paradigms, looking forward to raise the society standard of living.

We may analyze the modernization process from the perspective of aspects or subsystems in which changes and its main features are generated:

- a. *Economic*: Increase in productivity (technologic development, Industrial Revolution), Elimination of internal tariff barriers, Adoption of a national currency, Labor division, specialization.
- b. *Political*: Rise of the nation-state, Centralization of the bureaucracy, the incorporation of rational procedures in the recruitment and promotion of personnel, Bureaucracy as organization and articulation agent of society with the State.
- c. *Social*: Urbanization processes with rational criteria, Universal education, More equitable distribution of social satisfactors, Social permeability.
- d. *Culture*: Secularization of culture, Imposition of the scientific method over empiricism, struggle for modernizer voluntarism, instead of the traditional fatalism.

The modernization process could begin with any of the four areas, but they have to be combined in a more or less balanced way in order to bring about change. There is an interdependence relationship of the four subsystems and if there is no a regularly consistent evolution between them, in the long term, the most backward tend to limit development. The modernization occurred mainly during the XVII Century in the West and underpins colonialism. The prevailing mode of production were feudal systems with a social organization as follows:

The king was the representative of the State, in a decentralized system, in which he maintained a relation of being the first among equals, while the feudal nobility and the Church, had high political power, the bourgeoisie was the main depository of economic power and finally, the peasants in the lowest stratum of the population as thick.



According to the recommendations of Giovanni Sartori, we'll first clarify our use of the concept of democratic transition, its difference with the meaning of political change and we'll define its role in the social modernization dynamic. In its most extensive sense, political transition could be conceived as the change from one political regime to another, and we understand for political regime "the set of institutions governing the struggle for power and the exercise of power and of the values that animate life of such institutions. If one speaks specifically of a "democratic transition", it implies that the change goes from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one (Crespo, 1999).

Thus, we traveled to clarify the meaning of social mobility. In its most minimalist definition, it's understood as the equality of opportunities, in the sense that all individuals, regardless of their social heritage, such as income or education of their parents, have the same probability, in return for their effort to achieve their goals limited by technological change, urbanization, booms or economic crisis, violence, democratization level and other phenomena (Bourgeois, 1995).

As we mentioned at the beginning, the leisure activity of the subsystems is interpreted through the display of three concentric circles. An *inner circle*, first circle, where economic activity takes place while the outer circle, *third circle* is for the functioning of democratic political institutions, which protect the market, avoiding that it cause economic or social distortions. And the *middle one*, the second circle is social mobility, which serves as a vehicle to get to progress in all spheres of people's life, ensuring trained human resources to the market and critical sensed citizens to the Estate (Trueba, 2003).

How does modernization come out and therefore the democratic transition and social mobility in this scheme?

In a primitive sense, social modernization comes out from the called traditional societies, characterized by: a social dynamic in which interpersonal relationships are defined through emotional and affective bonds; an important religious component that influences on every aspect of daily life; population is predominantly concentrated in rural areas; the social structure is highly stratified and social mobility opportunities are limited, and their economies depend heavily on agriculture and other primary products. Limiting factors for the free development of the market.

Thus, the king tries to achieve efficiency on his organization to compete with the outside world by boosting the economy and the domestic market. Being this issues of concern to the bourgeoisie, and extensively convenient, the sovereign finds a good ally for their purposes, however, for carrying it out the crown requires a centralized power, confronting the king with the feudal nobility and with the Church.

In order to generate power that can be exercised effectively, there must be some concentration of power. In other words, an unequal distribution of power is essential. Only then, he who holds power could make decisions that apply efficiently to the members of the specific community or organization (Crespo, 2001).

Starting from a dispersion of power, the first step toward modernization is to centralize power, once we arrive to absolutism, this is the political tool to advance towards modernity.

Therefore, we have two opposite options for the distribution of power: a) a so evenly distributed power that it vanishes (anarchy), making it impossible to make decisions, which would cause paralysis and ungovernability, b) a totally focused power (absolutism or dictatorship), where there are high probabilities that rulers make ineffective or abusive decisions, without being able to restrain their power, impeach or punish them (Crespo, 2001).

Once the power is concentrated and the first steps are given toward modernization, continues to analyze the causal relation between social modernization and the link generated between citizen enlightenment or education and political mobilization, meaning by this the power of citizen organization to influence on any public matter.

As participation goes on, there are more conditions and incentives for political mobilization and education, as a privilege at the beginning of the epoch, and it stands as the initial link of social mobility. Adding the factors could generate a couple of scenarios:

- a) A high percentage of citizens participating actively in the State generates a greater possibility of political stability resulting from the inclusion of more citizens to the decision making process.
- b) When the rate of integration of citizenship within the active State is very low, in contrast, with the portion of it that remains excluded and is seeks for recognition and an enclosure of power, there are several probabilities of political instability.


From the above, we can infer that any intention to encourage and monitor the modernization process, comes out with social

revolutions. This is, in violent raids against the existing political, economic, social and cultural order, however, part of the old regime structure remains, giving rise to the emergence of new sources of legitimacy, and of new political elites.

Subsequent to the outcome of these armed struggles, power stays in the hands of the triumphant martial forces, which start suffering internal ruptures, which become mainly because of the lack of cohesion and the divergence between the groups of the revolutionary coalition, which struggle to stand on the top of the pyramid and to impose their interests over the other groups. Once this conflict is solved, usually in a violent way to completely remove or neutralize the opposition, a legitimate power monopoly emerges of in accordance with Dr. Crespo: first in the illegitimacy of the ousted regime, and secondly, in the promise of a generalized social benefit involved in all revolutionary ideology.

This monopolistic power starts to lay the groundwork which will institutionalize the regime. This point is highly important because it may result on three possible scenarios:

The options of the military dictatorship and rupture represent decreases the stability of the evolution towards modernity. Therefore, the fundamental step to continue this process is to facilitate the creation of the conditions for a peaceful transition of power from military to civilians.



Once power is demilitarized, the institutionalization process goes on, but, once the regime reaches its fullness “The own social and economic modernization advance, which is one of the key goals of the revolutionary parties, it gradually undermines its ability to preserve itself politically”(Crespo, 1998).

In other words, “As time passes, this regime legitimacy will be preserved as a result of the concrete achievements in social, economic, educational, sanitary, etc. The lack of political democracy wouldn’t be an important factor for population as long as there is an acceptable government performance in meeting social demands. As this performance starts satisfying those demands, then the regime’s legitimacy will decline, and in such conditions there could arise the demand for political mechanisms that ensure better performance of rulers, and the possibility of replacing them peacefully with others who offer better choices which result from a better education of citizenry that legitimizes their position in social climbing and inclusion in the power distribution. That is, the revolutionary legitimacy will only be maintained as far as there is a legitimacy derived from an effective management”(Crespo, 1999).

It obliges the system to walk towards democratization, but of course, based on an impulse of citizenry for new participation arenas, not only political but economic and social; these changes are triggering each other, in an increasingly dynamic and shooting process. Firstly allowing the incorporation of opposing parties, but in a cosmetic way, as a democratic formality which is both a virtual or fictitious space to make room to the aspirated social climbing demand. In the case of the strengthening of these parties, as a result of realizing the idea of achieving that social ascent in the community coupled with the decline of the regime, obliges the gradual transition towards competitive electoral processes, overseen by society, which incite to establish and require changes in the legal and institutional framework which firstly allow the culmination of the transition to democracy in the alternation of power and in the establishment of transparency and accountability processes, all along and wide the regime’s

pyramid scheme. And next, the establishment of conditions which allow the transit of individuals to one standard of living to another without the feasibility of a decline in the short term.

Finally, we could reflect the following: without education, as precept of social mobility, the existence of democracy would be confined to oversight; without incorporation of both into a single concept would invite to the resurgence of decrepit regimes. When the participation arenas in any of the subsystems (political, social, economic and cultural) are segmented or uneven, ascending mobility is impossible; then we are closer to the deterioration of democracy because each one depends on its cradle and not on its capacity. Social mobility straightened up by democratization of society is the only utopian possibility that is fertilized around a greater equality. The corruption of the above would lead to the hardening of social modernity.

The democratic transition and social mobility as a result of a social modernization process: the case of Mexico: evolution and peculiarities.

Within the long road to the Mexican social modernity, which resulted in the democratic transition of 2000, we distinguish a number of important historical events that marks incisively the stages of the implementation of the modernization process, taking as a starting point the centralization of power and the cancellation social mobility during the Porfiriato, which flowed into the armed struggle of 1910 from which derived the revolutionary regime, which during its institutionalization process it experimented a series of economic, social and political changes until it achieved such a monopoly of power, monolithic, which achieved to perpetuate itself for during over seven decades, until the flexible league of its hegemony, became into rigid causing the not so abrupt collapse of the system, avoiding that the fracture consumed the whole constructs without having the chance of safeguarding the triggers of such deterioration, society. In plain words, political and demagogic recycling of satisfying the economic, social and political demands and finally called in the such expected and gusted, weak Mexican democracy.

The Porfiriato and the Revolution of 1910

There is a clear analogy among the European modernization processes and the case of Latin American countries, especially the Mexican, in which we had in one side two forces struggling for power: the conservative groups that supported only a small part of the modernization process and the liberals seeking for the establishment of an effective democracy, in another layer the State's Church and as similar of the European feudal aristocracy, a landed oligarchy, and of the bourgeoisie, the urban sectors, finally, in the lowest stratum and as the bulk of population, a seriously marginalized and dispossessed peasantry.

The revolution of Ayutla marked the end of the polarization of the political class and the impoverished society. By 1854 all political formulas and the constitutional tricks to make the republic viable had failed, besides of the delayed hopes of an improvement in the population's living conditions, which demolished even more the social cohesion. During a little more than three decades, this fundamental dispute encouraged a division between the political classes and fragmented the country, paralyzing any attempt of material progress and dispersing political power. (Medina Peña, 2002).

Throughout the XIX Century, the liberals idealized the facility with which the country could get to a fully modern future (republican, capitalist, federal, democratic) with only intending and legislating over it. On their way, and in a sharper way, the conservatives idealized the colonial past which all kinds institutions (political, religious, economic, educational) denoted an anachronistic rigidity that made them eternally inappropriate to survive in a modern world (Krauze, 1994).

In spite of the triumphant story, Mexico wouldn't be a liberal country. In spite of the defeated version, Mexico wouldn't be either a conservative country. It was a country in permanent conflict between its tradition and modernity: oriented towards it, rooted in that. (Krauze, 1994). Mexico characterized itself from 1821 to

1867 by a movement towards political freedom at the expense of its material stagnant. Between 1867 and 1876, the rulers (Juarez and Lerdo) “for the first and only time” intended to simultaneously advance the goals of political freedom and economic progress, but failed due to civil strife and because of the obtained progress was slow and limited. (Medina Peña, 2002).

Porfirio Diaz achieved that many of Mexico’s conservative values were adopted wisely onto the liberal Mexico. Diaz himself was the best example of this strange compromise: formerly he was the president of a representative, democratic and federal republic; in fact he was the paternal dictator of an absolute monarchy, centralized and lifetime. (Krauze, 1994). Early in his administration, Diaz had to tackle the twin problems of the impossibility of reforming the 1857 Constitution to change the relation between the executive and the legislative to strengthen the federal executive action. And he went to the most unexpected procedure (to centralize power), establishing a set of informal rules of political deal, enough broad and generous to cover all the ambitions and shades of political opinion. (Medina Peña, 2002). But again becoming an integral part of the meaning of forgetting the peasants and of the political exclusion of an emerging middle class, but with liberal convictions.

Diaz’s approach to the country’s governability issue was embodied onto a series of behaviors, decisions and attitudes that were partly known at that time as reconciliation policies. It tends to view these policies as negative, like deviations or product of the treasons or deviations of the liberal creed. However, we must recognize that the conciliation was not confined to the Church, it virtually spread to all spheres of public life in Mexico: the peoples, the old conservatives, the media, the emerging political generations. But before putting them into action it was necessary to fix serious questions, being inclined on those that might disturb mainly the country in the emerging tranquility that initiated since the first moment of its independence: the state political classes and the army. Defining a clear course of action in regard to sedition and revolts, plagues which also affected the country since 1821 (Medina Peña, 2002).

Once this centralization of power was consolidated in the hands of Porfirio Díaz, we observe that there was a strong impulse to the economy and to development, however, there are two conditions to explain the 1910 revolution: in one side, Díaz's reforms didn't improve the distribution, nor social welfare (causing an imbalance between the four areas of modernization), and in the other side, his long stay in power and the excessive extension of the centralization stage, which lead us to a marginalized and dispossessed peasantry, which coupled with a bounded political participation that besides not finding the appropriate institutional channels, it degenerates in social revolutions engines and therefore, in a violent eruption of peace. As a result, in 1910 a new leader emerged and took up again the political ideology of the liberal reform against Porfirio Díaz: Francisco I. Madero. His program was simple: Mexico should be actually what it already was in the dead letter of the Constitution: a, representative, democratic and federal republic. (Krauze, 1994). After winning the elections in 1911, Madero gave rise to the only full democracy experiment in the XX Century in Mexico: the fifteen months of his administration. The Country seemed to have found a path to move from the Porfirian order, based on a mixed legitimacy (formally legal, but substantially traditional), towards a political life based on the single legal legitimacy, democratic and modern. Unfortunately, the coup d'état against Madero and his assassination on February 22, 1913 cut off that alternative. (Krauze, 1994).

Just as it happened with the collapse of the colonial order, a new era of social violence broke out, which was headed, naturally, the indispensable leaders (Krauze 1994). In a first stage of confrontation among the revolutionary icons, Venustiano Carranza successfully imposed on major figures like Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa. "Of course the internal conflict between revolutionaries can continue *ad infinitum*, even within the winner group which might keep subdividing itself into endless factions. Thus Obregón arose against Carranza, de la Huerta against Obregon, Díaz and Serrano against Calles, and later Escobar"(Crespo, 1998).

Finally, the internal struggles completed and succeeded in establishing coexistence (or convenience) rules, when the group that held the largest reserve of power, it reached an agreement in 1929 that gave birth to what would become during the next seventy years the official party. Some of the twin advantages of the birth of this new regime were that the “revolutionary regimes tried to satisfy the farmers, breaking the budgetary system and releasing them from the toll by debt, delivering land and allowing them to migrate to cities and to new industrial centers, plus a great economic development. However, the price for this development was political, undoubtedly an expensive one. The Mexican Revolution created a *sui generis* system whose centerpieces were the President of the Republic and the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Both served the National State which would ultimately save Mexico from the internal anarchy and of the external pressures, achieving that the country developed in balance, although with the cost of postponing democracy (Fuentes, 1992).

In this period we can clearly identify the dizzy spell of the four subsystems, denoting them with its most significant passages, which in turn would be the torch in the changeover to the next period. In the economic sphere, none of the circumstances detonated the armed struggle; it existed in this area a macroeconomic stability. Variables such as the growth rate was around 2.9% on average, the exchange rate was around 2.08 pesos per dollar, the inflation was 5% and at that time, the income of a Mexican citizen was 15% superior to that of a Japanese (Schettino, 2007). The observable economic deterioration of the time was the salary of public servants, a group that never showed affection for the insurgency.

On the other hand, the social arena turned pale, that is to say, the government suffered from amnesia of indemnifying the social grievance. In rural areas, hunger wandered in every face, hope emigrated to no one knows where, the city was forbidden territory; there was not space for being inserted in this place, the damage was deepened. But farmers were not the only ones who suffered discrimination, although they were those who most

suffered it, there was an emerging middle class, educated, willing to participate in the political life but unable to be added to its political convoy. Social mobility was not clear at that moment. This pair of circumstances came together with another one to catalyze the armed movement.

In the case of the political arena, it could be defined in three stages: the precedent to the Revolution, the revolutionary and the post revolutionary. In the one it is exalted the Porfirian *pax* and the rigidity of the years of Porfirio Díaz in the country, it is a time which helped in building the country after a shaky era; however it was never able to build and arrange the channels of power succession, making it unquestionably their participation in armed uprising. In the second stage, characterized by the scope of democracy, although in reduced evaporation, showed all people's necessity of inclusion in the evolution of the country; but the turmoil gripped it, democracy was silenced and led to a struggle for power even bloodier uninterruptedly until we reach the third stage. The commandments of the presidential succession were established and the expiration of the armed uprising as an access to power.


During this period of time if we could personify both concepts, the one of democratic transition and the social mobility one, these characters would be on the one hand Francisco I. Madero, who finally installed a democratic government but was still in debt to the social cause, and Emiliano Zapata, embodying the pure cause, demanded a better quality of life for those who he represented, the peasants.

It is clear that social modernization was fruitless at this time in Mexico. Only a subsystem reached adulthood, the economic one, while the immature social and political ones impeded modernization to be consolidated. We might even think in the extinction of these structures; however it wasn't like that, they survived and even strengthened in their redefinition.

The institutionalization of the PRI regime

Paradoxically, the revolution would eventually build during the 30', a political order not very different from the Porfirian, a new and anti-democratic state fundamentalism: the regime of the "institutional revolution", which Jose Vasconcelos baptized on a perfect way: "collective porfirism" (Krauze, 1994).

This new regime, led to one of the unique aspects that would mark the country's all areas development until the late XX Century. This feature was the conformation of a hybrid order that would allow him to conveniently take features of both an authoritarian regime, as that of a dominant party. This advantageous arrangement is called the hegemonic party. We can define the party hegemony "...as the virtual exercise of a political monopoly by a party, which however coexists in the political arena with legally registered opposition parties. It shares with the unique parties the evidence of organic link with the State, which means that it provides substantial and crucial resources to preserve the official party (called that way precisely because of its origin and state nature). In addition, it presupposes the legal existence of opposition parties; although the actual conditions under which the elections take place and the exercise of power don't correspond with those prevailing in genuine democracies (Crespo, 1998).



From the degree of institutionalization that this regime gets, its tenure will largely depend on it, although this will present a long period of stability derived from its revolutionary legitimacy, it is necessary to build strong foundations that allow the perpetuation of the political monopoly. These bases include formal and informal rules to rise to power, the players, the revolutionary family patriarch's faculties and prerogatives, which would strengthen the PRI's hegemony.


Among the facts we may distinguish as the foundation of the revolutionary institutionality building, it emphasizes the concentration of power in the omnipotent figure of the President of the Republic, even though formality established a democratic, republican and federal system, based on a tripartite plan of weights and counterweights among the Congress, the Legislative and the Executive Powers. Another important element is the principle of no reelection, which coupled to one of the core informal rules, the faculty of the president to choose his successor, but only within the party members. This fact generated that "Now all the power is for Caesar, but only for a nonrenewable six-year period. Caesar couldn't be reelected, but instead, it was reserved for him the right to appoint his successor, the new Caesar, perpetuating, thus, this system *ad infinitum*" (Fuentes, 1992), as it allowed mobility and permeability of different cliques within the party. Finally, depoliticizing the army and its respective subordination to the presidential figure cancelled the possibility of trying to non-peacefully to solve internal conflicts.

Another worthy to be considered factor is the proximity to the United States, which forced the regime to continue, even if cosmetically, with a democratic format.

The strengthening of these rules to the extent that any of the players in the political game could be able to pass over them, allowed the government to ensure the necessary conditions for postponing the transition to democracy by adopting a liberalization process, which although tends to democratization, it lets the power monopoly to perpetuate itself for a long period by legitimizing, with democratic formality, the non-competitive processes that

characterize it and alleviating the disadvantages which appear with a series of very pragmatic incremental steps resulting from the flexibility that identifies the hegemonic regimes.

It is essential to cite state corporatism emerged at that time and that for the Mexican case it held a metamorphosis of the original conception. Envisioned as an authoritarian political regime vertically organized from the state itself or well accepted by it; interface between society and the State in the echo of social demands. For Mexico, it was said that it mimicked past fascist regimes. On the following figure we'll observe the original concept vs. the Mexican and denote its deviation.



And it is the presidential term of Cardenas, in which the concept is defined and prevalent during the reign of the PRI. Said Roger Bartra, "with great dexterity Lázaro Cárdenas took advantage of them to provide a strong economic and social base to the non-democratic political mediation structure which started its development since the time of Obregon. The structure allows the Mexican state to promote agrarian reform, or even nationalize the oil industry, "with a high degree of security for its own hegemony and without changing the undemocratic structure of the state (Bartra, 1982).

Similar devices to the above described made easier the transition from one party dictatorship for over 70 years. Krauze clearly summarizes that “the real essence of the system was in the traditional political culture, premodern, from most of Mexicans, according to which politicians are the rightful owners not only of power but the country [...] In sum, the Mexican political system wasn’t a functional and modern edition of a very old way of coordinating power “(Krauze, 1997).

Archaeologic attempts held by disciples of the anachronistic regime now shows the inefficiency of such manipulations, although they try to disguise them with hues of social modernity where it’s no longer the used corporatism, but the paltry purchase of wills through the “disinterested” financial aid.

It’s well said, as conventional wisdom dictates, all by serving finishes itself and once and reached the zenith of the regime it began a decline that would gradually undermine the same rules which at the beginning consolidated it. Curiously, this process is result of the same thrust toward modernity and economic development flagged by the regime, which started, according to some experts, since the student movements of ‘68, while other experts say was with the electoral reforms of 1977, which detonated the increasingly steep slope of the strengthening of opposition.

What characterized this period was the movement of balances and to balances and vice versa in the subsystems. At Economy, the public spending increased since the sixties in order to install a welfare state but it was since the early eighties that the spending wasn’t enough to keep sustaining the model; the debt began devouring it. The former interpretation of the seventies said that the postwar economic growth had led, at least partially, to the deterioration of distribution. The critic emphasized that no other Latin American government had done so little for its people, although it had actually kept wages from their unions according to the inflation rate (Hansen, 1971). The debacle was evident, Mexico only focused on increasing the spending, not the revenue.

The case of the IMSS' funding illustrates how it worked the Revolution system worked. Instead of correcting the fees charged to employers and workers, there was a reduction on the payments to doctors, with the threat that if not that wasn't accepted, the worker would be replaced. (Vernon, 1963)

In the social sphere shocks weren't small, excerpts of rural guerrillas, an insistent student call on meeting social demands and stagnant social mobility were the nuances of this era. The racket of Agrarian Reform and Corporativism didn't work, the first one was only a decadent symbol of the Revolution, represented by Lucio Cabañas' lifting of weapons in the Guerrero mountains, in which he attacked the army, dispensed justice and kidnapped the state governor candidate. The banner, the resuscitation of labor and agricultural demands, buried or postponed in the way of the scheme to the most vulnerable ones. Previously, there was a student mobilization in 1968, a popular phenomenon, product of that crisis of political consciousness of the middle class. A student reaction against a non-liberal and authoritarian political system, which was unable to generate social mobility (Poniatowska, 1997).

The revolution regime became silent before the tragic scene of the assassination of the movement, there wasn't an argument which supported its legitimacy. The heir to the next presidential term, in his quest to be flattered with the group wounded to the survivors of that slaughter, it co-opts a great part of this group within public administration. The movement died and created fiction social mobility spaces, which will later be collapsed by the following economic crisis.

The chiaroscuro of the political scene wasn't less enjoyable. At first, the PRI *pax* outlined the power succession methodology. It snatched the barbaric behavior of the new revolutionary political class, and clarified that the only route to power was obedience and slavishness to the party. But the Revolution's maturation becomes proud at Lázaro Cárdenas' period; it was the nucleus of a call for society, specifically the working and peasant classes through their organizations. But this was an alliance which was

never shaped as a written agreement stipulating where exactly the obligations and rights of allies and, above all, the actual extent that the partnership would have in the future (Cordova, 1984).

In this period, social mobility was identified as politically motivated mobility, because during the Revolution regime, the six-year changes actually had relevant implications for the social status of those whom the Revolution made justice to (Hansen, 1971). The “corporatization” took a new turn to the social scene and it was done through universities and bureaucratic jobs which were closely linked to the authoritarian state welfare. The political panorama becomes crude in front of economic shocks and demagogic phrases as *technocratic populism* and *wealth management*, and ceased to be market related. What makes that a new kind would defeat the old political groups and technocrats appeared, who later on would face each other in 1988 for the presidential elections which would be marred by the gloomy triumph of the new political class. However, this new political class wasn’t exempt of receiving blows, and again the armed insurgency was revitalized in the hands of the Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista National Liberation Army, one more event diagnosed a terminal death to the regime.

For 1995, the regime was crumbling before the extreme situation of illegitimacy. Not only the Revolution system had managed well during the seventies, at that time any agreement was alien. An electoral reform was performed by taking away the process to government and depositing it onto a new institute, the Federal Electoral Institute, IFE. What handcuffed the PRI machinery to control the power succession. It was the prologue of an announced death.

Social Modernity collapsed in the seventies and could never take up again its course. The dyes to establish something different to the authoritarian regime undermined the strangulation of armed social movements of the period. The dethronement of the old political class did not show any change within the government apparatus, they simply mounted on its synergy. Now it was spoken of a targeted assistance policy and with the election backdrop,

there wasn't a change that nourished the soulless exchange promises of social justice. The access to a better standard of living was reserved only for the inner circle of power. Thus, a new era of social modernization was delayed.

Deinstitutionalization of the PRI's regime, transition to democracy and the social mobility vendetta.

It should be mentioned that though the recent decades economic facts had an important implication in the country's political and social life, because as discontent for the increasingly frequent economic crises grew, more dissidence were generated over the official party, one of the main vehicles that could help us to clarify the changes during the disintegration period of formal and informal rules of the PRI, are the various changes onto the electoral law, and which allowed the gradual decay of the official party, inversely related to the strengthening of opposition.

The strengthening of political parties has resulted, engine and river bed for Mexico's democratic transition, driven by the emerging civil society. The country's democratization has meant, above all, the construction and consolidation of political parties, and at the same time, they have been the vehicles for the expression of real political plurality (Woldenberg, 2000).

We may divide into three the areas of electoral reforms made in the country:

- a) **Progressive phase:** Given the regime's need to maintain its democratic formality, it needed to slowly give a series of concessions that would permit the strengthening of the party system. The watershed of this situation was marked when in the 1976 election the official party was the only in the race for the Presidency of the Republic. This led in 1979, under the leadership of President José López Portillo, that a reform was carried out in which the opposition won in one hand that the party registration level lowered, and in the other, the adoption of a proportional representation system.

- b) Regressive phase:** we consider this stage as a setback, since the 1987 reform joined the “governability clause”, which allowed the majority party get 50% + 1 of the seats in the Deputies Chamber, generating an overrepresentation problem. The rupture of a party’s faction led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, a result of the violation of one of the founding rules of the hegemony of the PRI, which could gain power only from the inside, led that the following reform in 1990 brought with it two fundamental importance changes, seeking to regain the lost legitimacy by the cynical electoral fraud of 1988: the creation of the IFE, but still with serious limitations, and the integration formula of Congress, in which it was marked a floor of 35% for the governability clause, nevertheless this concession was so expensive, since for every point above the limit there should given two positions within the chamber the party, resulting in a clear counter reform but for the surprised of many, even when this represented to reverse the struggle for the strengthening of the opposition, it was accepted by the National Action Party.
- c) Final democratic phase:** the birth of these reforms were largely bound by two unprecedented events since the institutionalization of the regime which evidenced its wear and its early loss of power monopoly. The first one was to break the rule of settling the internal struggle for power through non-violent ways, with the assassination of the official candidate Luis Donald Colosio, this violation of a basic statement was confirmed by the subsequent murder of Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the party’s general secretary. The other significant fact was the apparition of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, which although was not the first movement of this kind that arose in the country, it was the first one to be widely diffused by the media and supported by left-wing sectors radicalized by their political marginalization.

The 1994 reform focused mainly on a number of changes that allowed further strengthening of the IFE, and that tended to give it a greater autonomy which were consolidated into the 1996 reform, year in which the Congress integration formula was amended, where the majority party couldn't be over-represented with more than 8%. This reform laid the foundations for democratic transition which firstly occurred when the ruling party lost its majority in Congress during the elections of 1997 and its final outcome with the presidency alternation in 2000.

However, there is a fortunate sentence of Carlos Castillo Peraza about what this karma really is, "But the inheritance of the regime was not an organization but a mentality. The regime had collapsed, but the mythology built to legitimize itself was still there, not just in the PRI, in trade unions and peasant organizations created around it. Revolutionary nationalism was still in 1997 as strong as ever, holed up in that little "PRI-ist" we all have inside "(Castillo Peraza, 2006).

Finally, crossing the threshold of democratic competition we are in a highly unstable period. "The characteristic of transitions is that in its course the rules of political game are undefined. They aren't only in a constant flux but they are also generally object of an arduous contest, actors struggle not only to meet their immediate interests or of those they pretend to represent, but also for defining rules and procedures which configuration will probably determine who would be losers and winners in the future" (O'Donnell, Schmitter, Crespo, 1999).

What now remains for us is to wait that the country achieves a sufficient political maturity that lets us to consolidate the so long-awaited democracy and have a "normal" political life. "Normality is understood, therefore, as the moment in which the basic disagreement among the actors no longer exists and leads to a set of new rules, agreed and respected by those actors" (Crespo, 1999). And our main political actors understand that the antonym of authoritarianism is not democracy, but of lack of governability. Sure, but the legitimizing ideology persists despite the fall of the regime.

On social mobility, no major changes were made. During this period, Mexican society reorganized itself into a complex structure of classes and social strata, where large sectors with career aspirations resulted, but also the drivers in the political, social and economic issues. The middle and lower classes affected by the prolonged economic crisis found in informality the exhaust valve to economic problems that still persist. The new social accommodation struggles to consolidate its own space, even against those who, blessed with past ways of thinking and acting, resist to it. The starring role that these emerging social groups have played in the changes that occur today in economic, political and social structures is a result of mass educational opportunities, but it's still far from being meritorious of recognition to climb up the social ladder. However, the future consolidation of these changes would lie more in a society with a high quality education, than in the continuing quantitative growth education process *per se*.

The mobility achieved by these groups has set the stage for establishing the deepest grievances. However, as being individuals on the rise, it is also natural to understand why they have become its main critics, especially in the field of pending to carry out educational improvements. In this field, its main concern is focused on linking actions, absent during their professional training, which would have facilitated their integration into the labor market. These groups have created a consensus in Mexico that puts the education issue as one linked to the values of equality, fairness and justice posted in the third constitutional article in exchange that is would be competitive and qualified (Dettmer, 1990). Consequently, they face two major challenges: first, to reduce the gap between aspirations and reality, and on the other, to achieve educational change that promotes linking, competitiveness and quality.

In this context, the several years' repudiation of protection and inequality, has permeated these emerging groups onto supporters and promoters of the democracy struggle, but without recognizing the role of governmental promotion of opening the Economy and

society. This way, the electoral principle of democracy at polls is a bounded and simplistic conception and it must be reconciled with the sense of individual and collective welfare without losing the neither frenetic radicalism nor its imitation with the immobilizer conservativeness.

Conclusions

We can't demonize the authoritarian processes neither cataloguing as kind the democratic ones.

Both processes, authoritarian and are democratic are forms of order and social change. It is inexact that society freezes itself under authoritarian regimes and mobilizes under democratic ones. Society changes in the midterm, in ones and in others, under various forms, but it transforms, creates the conditions for its maintenance, destruction or overcoming, according to the cases. Even it combines authoritarian-democratic forms, although this seem pointless (Delich, 2003).

Nowadays, socially, the egalitarian and integrative *ethos* isn't confused with access, but it's expressed in a demand that defines the equality of opportunities starting from the quality of diversified contents of goods and services. This occurs in several fields of social life, for instance, in education, health, labor, information and decision making, at the same time, equity, defined in terms of same quality but different content according to the demand, it questions the commercial or self-regulatory policies in various areas of society, and complicates the job of the State and public policies. (Gurrieri and Torres-Rivas, 1990) Politically, the participation today is being redefined more in terms of representation, which questions the traditional forms of social and political organization founded in mobilization.

The yearning is to reach modernity based on a worthy distribution, fair and proportional to the effort, and therefore political participation and oversight of democratic processes would come out. For this, education as a sustained vehicle of social "meritority" is deeply

committed to break with outdated formative traditions, to seek education systems that encourage creativity, develop teamwork, deepen the sense of social solidarity and they favor tolerant political participation with opposing ideas (Dettmer, 1990).

The regime of the Mexican Revolution allowed to our country a certain degree of social peace, but at a huge cost: the one of not improving Mexicans standard of living, not reducing the levels of inequality, not changing social structure and not promoting political development (Schettino, 2007).

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